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ENGAGEMENT, PERSISTENCE, PROGRESS AND 
SUCCESS AS THEORETICALLY DISTINCT ASPECTS 
OF BUSINESS CREATION PROCESSES

Per Davidsson, Australian Centre for Entrepreneurship Research, QUT, Australia, 
and Jönköping International Business School, Sweden
ABstRACt
Starting from the vantage point that explaining success at creating a venture should be the unique 
contribution—or at least one unique contribution—of entrepreneurship research, we argue that 
this success construct has not yet been adequately defined an operationalized. We thus offer sug-
gestions for more precise conceptualization and measurement of this central construct. Rather 
than regarding various success proxies used in prior research as poor operationalizations of success 
we argue that they represent other important aspects of the venture creation process: engagement, 
persistence and progress. We hold that in order to attain a better understanding of venture creation 
these constructs also need to be theoretically defined. Further, their respective drivers need to be 
theorized and tested separately. We suggest theoretical definitions of each. We then develop and 
test hypotheses concerning how human capital, venture idea novelty and business planning has 
different impact on the different assessments of the process represented by engagement, persistence, 
progress and success. The results largely confirm the stated hypotheses, suggesting that the concep-
tual and empirical approach we are suggesting is a path towards improved understanding of the 
central entrepreneurship phenomenon of new venture creation.
intRoDuCtion
Arguably, explanations of success at creating a venture should be the unique contribution—or 
at least one unique contribution—of entrepreneurship research. In relation to “traditional” busi-
ness/management research, this is an entirely new question. While being at the very core of the 
entrepreneurship domain we argue that for decades of entrepreneurship research this question has 
not been pursued with sufficient conceptual and empirical precision. For example, much of early 
entrepreneurship research contrasted the characteristics of entrepreneurs (samples of business 
founders or business owners) with those of other groups (samples of managers or of the general 
population). As observed by Davidsson (2004), if in such a contrast the “entrepreneurs” prove to 
be different on some characteristic we would not know whether that characteristic contributed to 
making them engage in a business start-up in the first place or, alternatively, individuals with that 
characteristics are over represented in the entrepreneur sample because they are more persistent 
(regardless of the performance of the business) or more successful at starting a viable business 
(therefore remaining in the “entrepreneur” category at the time of the research). Thus, apart from 
the cross-sectional design peril of reverse causation such contrasts confound factors associated 
with the propensities to engage, persist and succeed in entrepreneurial behavior, respectively. 
Process oriented research following business start-ups as they happen (e.g., the Panel Study 
of Entrepreneurial Dynamics, PSED, and similar projects; see Davidsson & Gordon, in press; 
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Reynolds & Curtin, 2011) is better positioned to disentangle the drivers of different outcomes. 
However, there is no consensus in the literature as regards the dependent variables. In most 
instances the researchers explicitly or implicitly interpret their DVs as operationalizations of suc-
cess; however, as observed by Davidsson and Gordon (in press) the operationalization is often 
better regarded as persistence – evidence that the start-up effort has not yet been abandoned. The 
PSED-type line of research has also introduced another outcome criterion for early stage business 
creation processed, namely making progress, operationalized either as the achieving of particular 
milestones or the accumulation of completed gestation activities in a time period. Like measures 
of persistence, this criterion is usually interpreted as reflecting success. In other instances closer 
proxies to a theoretical definition of success are used, such as evidence of an extended period of 
having sales or positive cash flow on a regular basis. Some papers demonstrate interesting differ-
ences in results with respect to different outcome variables (e.g., Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Honig 
& Karlsson, 2004; Rotefoss, 2005) but they typically do not theorize differential impact. 
The use of varying and sometimes rather distant proxies for success in business creation 
research leads not only to conflicting results, but also to confusion regarding the influence of 
certain predictors. We argue that in order to progress further, business creation research needs 
theoretical development. This starts with theoretically defining what “success” means in research 
on new venture creation processes. Theoretically defining business creation success is a neces-
sary condition for assessing the validity of extant measures and for developing new and better 
operationalizations. However, business creation processes are heterogeneous and complex (Liao & 
Welsch, 2003; Lichtenstein, Carter, Dooley, & Gartner, 2007; Reynolds & Miller, 1992) and theoriz-
ing and testing of direct drivers of success without consideration of the factors that influence the 
steps on the way may as a consequence not be successful. Therefore, rather than discarding opera-
tionalizations more closely reflecting engagement, persistence or progress as distant and therefore 
questionable indicators of success,  these constructs should be regarded important theoretical 
building blocks in their own right, and better theory should be developed regarding their respec-
tive drivers as well as regarding how they differ from one another and from drivers of success. 
Although partial examples exist (e.g., DeTienne, Shepherd, & De Castro, 2008; Gimeno, Folta, 
Cooper, & Woo, 1997), such theorizing is rare in the entrepreneurship literature.
On the theoretical side this paper offers more precise definitions of engagement, persistence, 
progress, and success, respectively. Importantly, we also theorize how human capital, venture idea 
novelty, and business planning differentially influence these different markers of the entrepre-
neurial process. Empirically, we suggest operationalizations of these core outcome constructs and 
test hypotheses about the differential effects on engagement, persistence, progress, and success.
tHEoREtiCAL DEvELopmEnt AnD HypotHEsEs
Theoretical definitions
Engagement in venture creation processes is clearly something quite different from entrepre-
neurial success. It is a concept that can be defined either on the individual level or the level of the 
(emerging) venture. The former largely coincides with the second of Shane and Venkataraman’s 
(2000) three major questions for entrepreneurship research: “Why do some people and not others 
discover and exploit (…) opportunities?” Individuals may engage in venture creation processes 
for a multitude of different reasons and it is important to understand these reasons as well as their 
implications for performance down the track. The corresponding venture level question, while 
overlooked by Shane and Venkataraman (2000), is also theoretically and practically interesting: 
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What characteristics of “opportunities” make it likely that people identify and act upon them? 
However, due to space and empirical limitations we will here concentrate on the individual level. 
The individual level question can be asked within different time frames. Taking a life history or 
career perspective the question becomes what makes people engage in entrepreneurial activity at 
any point in time. This may be the better choice if the interest is strictly in person-related factors 
or variance in “degrees” of engagement is of interest (cf. Ucbasaran, Westhead, & Wright, 2006). 
Alternatively, engagement can be defined with reference to a particular time—typically the time 
when the empirical study is undertaken. This may be preferable when situational variables are 
also of interest and it may also present less daunting challenges from the perspective of empiri-
cal design. It is the choice that has been made by the (inter-related) GEM and PSED research 
programs (Gartner, Shaver, Carter, & Reynolds, 2004; Reynolds et al., 2005; Davidsson & Gordon, 
in press). This is also the perspective we focus on here. From this perspective engagement is about 
an individual taking active, “inside” part as founder in a venture creation attempt at a particular 
point in time. This may be the first time the individual shows such engagement or they may be 
an experienced business founder. They may do it on their own or as part of a team. The “active” 
criterion demands that there is more than an intention—tangible activity towards the realization 
is required. Further, the definition excludes passive investors and occasional helpers. These crite-
ria largely coincide with the screening procedure developed in the GEM/PSED research stream 
(Reynolds, 2009). Based on the above reasoning, for the purpose of this paper we define entrepre-
neurial engagement as follows:
Engagement: An individual’s active, behavioral involvement as founder-owner in a business 
start-up attempt at a particular point in time. 
This definition implies that a study of engagement should contrast individuals fulfilling the 
definitional criteria with those who do not.
Persistence in venture creation can likewise be defined on the individual level or on the ven-
ture level. The two differ, for example, when one member of an entrepreneurial team abandons a 
continuing business start-up effort. We choose here to put the main emphasis on the individual 
level: What is it that makes some people more likely than others to keep trying in entrepreneur-
ial endeavors? An ideal examination of this question would hold characteristics of the venture 
and the environment constant (Shugan, 2007). In studies of real-world entrepreneurship this is 
not possible, and such characteristics instead become part of the explanation for the individual’s 
persistence. As was the case for engagement, even if restricted to venture creation (rather than 
including keeping established businesses alive) persistence can be defined and studied within dif-
ferent time frames. With a longer time frame it would include consideration of what individuals 
are more likely to bounce back and re-enter venture creation processes after previous efforts have 
been terminated one way or the other. With the shorter time perspective employed here, persis-
tence refers to staying on and continuing the attempt to get a particular venture creation process 
to a successful outcome. Persistence is demonstrated by the individual’s continued investment of 
time and (possibly/probably) other resources in the emerging new venture. Conceptually this is 
quite far removed from any meaningful definition of success. It is also a theoretically complex (or 
even ambiguous) notion with connotation to the supposedly positive quality of tenacity (Baum 
& Locke, 2004; Khan, 1986) as well as to the psychological traps of escalation-of-commitment 
(McCarthy, Schoorman, & Cooper, 1993) or “foolish consistency” (Cialdini, 1988) that would 
make founders stay too long and invest too much in “doomed” ventures. Based on the above 
reasoning, for the purpose of this paper we define entrepreneurial persistence as follows:
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Persistence: An individual’s continued active, behavioral involvement as founder-owner in a 
business start-up attempt at a particular point in time. 
This definition implies that a study of persistence follow individuals who were engaged in 
business start-up efforts at a given previous point in time and compare their status. 
Progress in the entrepreneurial process is best conceived of as a venture level construct. It 
consists of behavioral steps or actions that presumably reduce the gap between the current state 
and the goal state of a successfully established venture. Such steps may include necessary or 
near-necessary milestones like completing the development of a marketable product or service; 
registering a legal entity, and raising some kind of funding, as well as supplementary or facilitating 
actions like the creation of a website and applying for intellectual property protection. Progress 
does not require individual level persistence—the baton can be picked up by new owners—
but often partly overlaps the notion of persistence since presumably individuals fulfilling the 
minimum requirement of continuing to invest time in the venture do something tangible during 
that time. However, the notion of progress is more sensitive to the intensity and effectiveness of the 
effort. Consisting of concrete steps aiming to bring the venture to realization progress is arguably 
somewhat more proximal to success – without in any way guaranteeing success as defined below. 
Progress is a requirement for success; unless it reaches a certain level of progress a venture cannot 
be successful as defined below. This said, given the enormous heterogeneity of business creation 
processes there is little to build on in suggesting exactly which actions are critical. The empirical 
literature has focused on 4-30+ manifest activities, conceptually grouped into different theoretical 
schemas (Brush, Manolova, & Edelman, 2008; Davidsson & Klofsten, 2003; Delmar & Shane, 2004; 
Gatewood, Shaver, & Gartner, 1995; Klofsten, 1994; Reynolds, 2007). Further theoretical precision 
is desirable (Davidsson & Gordon, in press), but beyond the scope of the current paper. Based 
on the above reasoning, for the purpose of this paper we define progress in the venture creation 
process as follows:
Progress: the completion of necessary and facilitating actions aimed at reducing the gap 
between the venture’s current state and the desired end state of success as defined below. 
This definition implies that a study of venture creation progress should follow emerging ven-
tures over time and compare among continuing start-up efforts their degree of progress between 
two points in time.
Success. It is important to distinguish success at creating a venture from success at running a 
business. As noted in our Introduction section it is arguably explanations of success at creating a 
venture that should be the unique contribution of entrepreneurship research. Thus, success for 
our purposes does not consist in comparing the relative performance of young businesses in terms 
of growth and profitability long after they become established. At least, it should be recognized 
that studies aiming at explaining the financial performance of young firms may confound drivers 
of successful business creation with drivers of successful management of young firms, so they ought 
to try to disentangle these two phenomena. Success at venture creation can be assessed at differ-
ent levels and the distinctions are hugely important. An individual level definition would require 
that the entrepreneurially engaged individual came out of the process with positive net utility, 
whether derived from financial gains or otherwise. Even if restricted to financial gain, the differ-
ence between individual and venture level success is important to uphold. For example, when the 
founders of the (entirely hypothetical) venture Superhype.com sold their not-yet-trading venture 
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to Fearless & Clueless Investors Inc. for $1 billion, it was an example of huge venture creation suc-
cess for the founders. Not so for the buyers. 
We will focus here on the venture level, but before doing so we should also note the distinc-
tion between venture- and societal level success. As pointed out by Davidsson (2004) innovative 
ventures that are unsuccessful at the micro level—dubbed Catalyst Ventures—may still have con-
siderable positive societal value due to what they trigger among more successful followers. On the 
venture level, we would argue for defining success as the proven ability of the venture to recover 
all its start-up costs from proceeds of market transactions other than the sale of the venture itself. 
With a less demanding criterion—such as having regular sales—is not known whether the con-
tinued operations of the start-up represents gainful activity or resource destruction. A period of 
positive cash flow is then arguably a better criterion but may lead to prematurely calling a front 
end R&D intensive start-up “successful”. Conversely, spectacular profit or loss (or even termina-
tion) after the break-even point is arguably no longer a matter of venture creation performance 
but represents effects of strategy (or luck) in managing an established business. Further, albeit a 
positive financial outcome through sale of the venture is a valid indicator of individual founder 
success it does not distinguish between investor ignorance (or bad luck) on the one hand, and ven-
tures that have become viable market-trading entities on the other. We argue that venture creation 
success assessed at the level of the venture itself requires that the venture has demonstrated itself as 
viable economic entity that can sustain itself and satisfy its stakeholders through its own retained 
earningsi. Based on the above reasoning we define venture creation success as follows:
Success: the achieving of a point when the venture has recovered all its start-up costs from 
profitable operations in its product/service market(s).  
This definition implies that an ideal study of venture creation success should follow emerg-
ing ventures over time and examine which continuing business start-up efforts ever fulfill this 
criterion of success. The characteristics of such ventures will reveal the drivers of success, given 
continuation.
Hypothesis development
Below we develop our hypotheses concerning the influence of human capital, venture idea 
novelty, and business planning on the outcome variables as defined above. Influences on engage-
ment will only be developed for human capital. Due to space limitations our development of 
hypotheses will be brief.
Human capital. The arguments regarding the effects of human capital on engagement have 
been developed previously by, e.g., Davidsson and Honig (2003) and Kim, Aldrich, and Keister 
(2006). In short, general human capital provides individuals with a knowledge base that make 
them more likely to be able to see entrepreneurial opportunities and have the confidence to pursue 
them. Human capital is also a resource that can have secondary effects by facilitating the access to 
other resources (Brush, Greene, & Hart, 2001; Kim et al., 2006). This is even more true for specific 
human capital, and there is already much evidence in the literature that those who already run 
their own business or are close to this phenomenon by working for an entrepreneur or by hav-
ing self-employed parents are over represented among business founders. However, individuals 
with higher general human capital also have more attractive other opportunities. Therefore, the 
relationship between general human capital and persistence should be indeterminate (Gimeno 
et al., 1997). The same goes for specific human capital, but for a different reason: being domain 
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experts, individuals with high specific human capital should be better at exploring the viability 
of venture ideas at low cost and to terminate earlier rather than later their involvement in those 
that on closer look do not appear particularly attractive. This would counterbalance any positive 
effect on persistence deriving from higher expected gain from venture creation (relative to other 
people and relative to paid employment). Thus, it is only when the domain-specific knowledge 
continues to support the initial belief in the opportunity—what Dimov (2010) calls “opportu-
nity confidence”—that it should boost persistence. With regards to later stages in the process the 
predictions for the two forms of human capital diverge. There are both theoretical and empirical 
reasons to question whether general human capital prepares very well for the uncertain and some-
times messy context of new venture creation. For example, Davidsson and Honig (2003) notes that 
as the process progresses, human capital and less specific forms of capital become decreasingly 
important. Based on this reasoning, we hypothesize that:
H1: General human capital is positively related to a) engagement but has no systematic effect 
on b) persistence, c) progress, or d) success.
H2: Specific human capital is positively related to a) engagement but has no systematic 
effect on b) persistence. Given persistence, specific human capital should facilitate c) making 
progress and d) attaining success.
Venture idea novelty. Great success stories are likely to be found primarily among ventures 
building on innovative venture ideas, i.e., those having a high degree of novelty. However, this 
does not mean that novelty facilitates performance in the venture creation process itself. The lure 
of a possible high reward in the end may make founders of novel ventures more willing to persist. 
However, this may be counterbalanced by the arguably worse problems of liability of newness 
(Aldrich & Auster, 1986) and lack of legitimacy (Delmar & Shane, 2004) facing innovative ven-
tures compared to their imitative counterparts. We therefore argue that the effect of novelty on 
persistence is indeterminate. We also argue that among continuing ventures it should be harder 
for those representing high degrees of novelty to make progress and to reach the success thresh-
old (although those who do so may be more likely to enjoy higher levels of success later on (cf. 
Audretsch, 1995). 
Business planning. Despite its stronghold in entrepreneurship education, the empirical evi-
dence concerning the effect of planning in early stages of venture development is weak or mixed 
(Brinckmann, Grichnik, & Kapsa, 2010; Davidsson & Gordon, in press). Theoretical predictions 
are also seemingly contradictory. Theories focusing on action and goal setting emphasize the posi-
tive effects of planning (Ajzen, 1991; Delmar & Shane, 2003; Frese, 2009). However, other psycho-
logical theories imply planning can lead to “foolish consistency” or escalation of commitment , i.e., 
persistence for the wrong reasons (Cialdini, 1988; McCarthy et al., 1993). On the other hand, one 
of the potential positive effects of planning is that it may help founders reach the conclusion to 
terminate “doomed” efforts earlier rather than later. Due to these conflicting influences we argue 
that the relationship between planning and persistence is indeterminate. Given persistence, the 
action-theoretic argument would apply: planning facilitates action and thus progress. However, 
due to the risk that this progress represents unsound continuation down an unfruitful path of 
escalating commitment the effect on success is again indeterminate. Based on the above reasoning 
we hypothesize that:
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H3. While the influence of venture idea novelty on a) persistence will be indeterminate, its 
effect on b) progress and c) success will be negative.
H4. While effect of business planning on a) persistence and c) success will be indeterminate, 
its effect on b) progress will be positive.     
Table 1 summarizes the stated hypotheses. The displayed pattern of predictions highlights 
that if our theoretical reasoning has some validity there is certainly reason to make better distinc-
tions conceptually and empirically among these outcome variables. Further, the table suggests that 
it is considerably easier to make theoretical predictions about progress than about persistence, at 
least based on the predictor constructs used here. 
mEtHoD
Sample and Data
The data used for testing our hypotheses are from the Comprehensive Australian Study of 
Entrepreneurial Emergence (CAUSEE). CAUSEE is a longitudinal panel study of nascent and 
young firms. Adult members of 30.105 Australian households, selected through random digit dial-
ing, were screened for status as nascent entrepreneurs (NE) using techniques that have been care-
fully refined through prior projects (Reynolds, 2009). A total of 1,010 individuals qualified as NEs, 
meaning they were currently engaged in an emerging business venture. Of the 1,010 identified 
NEs, 997 completed the remainder of the short screening interview, which means rudimentary 
indicators of general and specific human capital are available. The same is true for 499 control 
respondents, who were randomly selected among those who did not qualify as NEs or founders 
of young firms. We will contrast these two samples in order to test our hypotheses regarding the 
effects of human capital on entrepreneurial engagement. Qualified NEs are regarded informants 
on behalf of the venture start-up they were involved in and were directed to a comprehensive, 
40-60 minutes long telephone interview (W1) about the emerging venture, either directly or by 
later appointment. Thus, much richer data about the founders and their ventures are available 
for our tests of persistence, progress and success. The W1 was completed by 625 cases (61.9% of 
those eligible). As close as possible to 12 and 24 months after the first interview, respondents were 
re-contacted for equally comprehensive follow-up interviews (W2 and W3) including informa-
tion on outcomes as well as capturing many other aspects of the ventures’ development. W2 was 
completed by 488 respondents (78.1% of eligible cases). This is the sample size for our test of per-
sistence. Of the W2 respondents, 337 were still actively involved in the start-up. This is the sample 
size for our tests of hypotheses pertaining to progress and success. See (Davidsson & Steffens, 2011; 
Davidsson, Steffens, & Gordon, 2011) for further details on CAUSEE and its sample. 
Operationalization: Dependent Variables
Engagement. As mentioned above, the operationalization of engagement coincides with the 
sampling definition of “nascent entrepreneur”. Thus, it is a dichotomous variable where a score of 
1 was given to respondents who at the time of the interview affirmed they were actively involved 
in a business start-up in which they were going to be an owner; where concrete steps towards firm 
formation had been undertaken within the past 12 months, but where the business did not as yet 
have sales that covered all costs on a regular basis. The comparison group, scoring 0 failed to fulfill 
at least one of these criteria. In addition, they were not classified as founder-owners of a young 
business, either. Thus, the variable contrasts individuals who are currently involved in a start-up 
attempt with individuals who are not.  
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Persistence. In W2 (12 month follow-up) a combination of objective and (if needed) subjec-
tive criteria were used to determine the status of the venture and the respondent. Persistence is a 
dichotomous variable where 1 is recorded for cases where the venture is not yet abandoned and 
the respondent has both sustained an active involvement in it and plans to continue to do so for 
at least another six months. All cases where the venture has been terminated (138 out of the 488) 
get the score zero. In addition, 13 cases where the respondent has terminated their involvement in 
a continuing start-up also score zero. 
Progress. In each wave of data collection the CAUSEE data collection assesses which of 30+ 
“Gestation Activities” – such as preparing a business plan; buying equipment; organizing prem-
ises; hiring employees; creating a website, and the like (Gartner, Carter, & Reynolds, 2004) – have 
been initiated or completed. Our measure of progress in the venture creation process is the number 
of gestation activities completed between the first and the second interview. This measure has been 
used in several previous articles on new venture creation (see Davidsson & Gordon, in press). We 
dichotomized the count measure at the median so the same type of analysis technique (logistic 
regression) could be used for all dependent variables. Note that only respondents who had not dis-
engaged by W2 are included in the analysis. Hence, the test concerns “progress, given persistence” 
for a purer test of progress per se.
Success. In W3 we included a question specifically aimed at success in venture creation (as 
distinct from success in subsequent management). The verbatim question, which was asked only 
in case earlier questions had indicated some extended period of positive cash flow, reads as follows:
Let’s assume I posed the following question to your accountant or some other person 
with good insights into the history and financials of this business. Question: As of today, 
would it be possible to sell or walk away from this business, and it would have covered 
all the costs incurred for developing it to what it currently is?” What do you think that 
knowledgeable person would answer – “Yes, definitely”, “Yes, Probably”, “No, probably not” 
or “No, definitely not”?
Respondents who did not choose one of the “yes” alternatives were asked whether—after the 
venture started trading in the market on a regular basis—there had ever been a point in time when 
it had been possible to sell or walk away from the business, all start-up costs thereby having been 
recouped. Importantly, this same question was also asked to respondents of discontinued start-
ups on the grounds that these cases also fulfilled the criterion of venture creation success, even if 
they later on—for whatever reason—became unsustainable. Cases where the respondent answered 
affirmatively were coded 1 if they also fulfilled the additional criterion that the underlying cost 
calculation included “reasonable remuneration to the owners for their work, at least similar to 
the salary they could have earned doing some work as an employee?” This was the case for 51 
cases. All other cases were considered not (yet) successful and coded 0. The operationalization 
does not exclude the possibility of profitable sale of a business that will never recoup its start-up 
costs. Neither does it exclude the possibility of inflated valuation on the part of the respondent. 
However, it is important to note that a score of 1 includes also the second best available indicator 
of venture creation success, namely that the venture has experienced an extended period of posi-
tive cash flow. Further, in order to assess the robustness of the results we have undertaken analyses 
with this DV as well.  
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Operationalization: Independent Variables
General human capital was operationalized as education, which is a frequently used indica-
tor of this theoretical construct (e.g., Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994). For the test of 
engagement hypotheses, using only information from the screener interview, a dummy indicating 
whether or not the respondent had a university degree. For the other tests more information was 
available; we use a level of education variable reflecting the respondent’s level of education on a 
six-point scale. In addition, we use respondent age as indicator of general human capital, based 
on experience increasing with age. However, as many abilities decay at higher age we assume any 
positive effect of general human capital to produce a curvilinear effect of age, reflecting the most 
positive effect when individuals are at their prime (cf. Bosma, Van Praag, Thurik, & De Wit, 2004). 
For Specific Human Capital only proxies are available for testing the engagement hypotheses. 
Aldrich, Renzulli and Langton (1998) discuss different reasons for effects of having self-employed 
parent(s). Arguing that transfer of domain-specific knowledge is one important reason we use 
this as one of our indicators of specific human capital. Cases were the respondent had at least one 
parent who was or had been running their own firm were coded 1 and other cases 0. We include 
(female) biological sex as a second (negative) indicator of specific human capital on the basis 
that entrepreneurship is male gendered (Ahl, 2006) and that many female-dominated vocations 
present limited opportunities for independent start-up activity (Verheul & Thurik, 2003). For the 
tests of progress, persistence and success stronger indicators are available. We use (same) industry 
experience in years and start-up experience as number of previous start-ups. Both variables are 
summed across all team members (as reported by the original respondent). Both variables were 
logarithmized based on an assumption of decreasing marginal utility of additional experience. We 
do not include biological sex as indicator of specific human capital in analyses where these more 
direct indicators are available.
Venture idea Novelty was assessed across four dimensions: product; method for producing 
or sourcing; method or promotion and selling, and selection of target market/customers. For 
each dimension a sequence of questions was asked and coded so that 0 means “imitative” whereas 
the highest score (3) reflects “new to the world”. Intermediate levels correspond to a substantial 
improvement to what is currently offered by others in the market served (1) or to something 
“entirely new” in that specific market (2). The wording was slightly different for the market new-
ness dimension. The four dimensions were aggregated into a formative index with scores in the 
0-12 range. We treat this variable as continuous in the analysis. The scale is a refinement of the 
novelty scale developed by Dahlqvist and Wiklund (2011).
Business Planning was operationalized as a dichotomous variable where code 1 indicates an 
affirmative answer at W1 to “A business plan usually outlines the markets to be served, the prod-
ucts or services to be provided, the resources required – including money – and the expected 
growth and profit for the new business.  Have you already begun preparation of a business plan 
for this new business, will you prepare one in the future, or is a business plan not relevant for this 
new business?”. About 2/3 of all respondents claimed the existence of some form of business plan. 
The remaining cases were coded 0.
Operationalization: Control variables
We use a carefully selected set of control variables in order to reduce the problem of unmea-
sured heterogeneity. First, the DVs are likely to be highly sensitive to the W1 Stage of Development. 
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We operationalize this as the number of gestation activities already completed at W1.  To bet-
ter separate the effects of our IVs from effects of mere effort we also control for W1-W2 Hours 
Invested, i.e., the (approximate) total number of hours invested in the venture by all team mem-
bers between the first two interviews. We control for type of venture in several ways. Dummies 
were included for three industry categories as well as for Product Focus (as opposed to mainly 
selling services). Based on comprehensive preparatory work reported in Davidsson, Steffens, 
Gordon, Garonne and Senyard (2009) we also introduced the dummies Brick-And-Mortar-Only 
for ventures intending 0% online sales, and for Venture Ambition, where 1 indicates a preference 
for maximum growth over a small, manageable size. We also control for team ventures. Based on 
the findings by Ruef, Aldrich and Carter (2003) we include separate dummies for Spouse Team and 
Other Team, respectively.
REsuLts AnD impLiCAtions
Table 2 shows that all our indicators of human capital have positive and highly significant 
relationships with entrepreneurial engagement (intermediate age is assumed to reflect the peak of 
general human capital; female sex is assumed to reflect—on average—less domain-specific human 
capital). While mixed evidence can be found in the empirical literature this is certainly not the first 
time these relationships have been demonstrated. However, what is important about our analysis 
is that the relationships are theorized as specified influences on entrepreneurial engagement and 
not as atheoretical “characteristics of entrepreneurs”, and that they are tested in an empirical set-
ting that can reveal effects on engagement without too much confounding with persistence or 
success. Even more importantly, the results are presented alongside analyses where differential 
impact on variables further into the venture creation process are theorized and demonstrated. 
This is what we turn to next.
Table 3 displays our main analyses, which relate human capital, venture idea novelty and 
business planning to different outcome variables. By and large we would argue these analyses 
support the idea of differential influences on different outcomes and therefore the importance of 
studying these different outcomes as separate theoretical constructs. As predicted, while general 
human capital is strongly related to engagement it is ascribed no consistent influence on persis-
tence, progress, or success. Interestingly, the hypothesis of indeterminate effect of specific human 
capital on persistence is “supported” for the “wrong reason”—while the effect of industry experi-
ence is positive the effect of previous start-up experience comes out negative. This indicates these 
relationships need to be theorized on an even finer level of (dis)aggregation. As predicted, specific 
human capital is ascribed positive effects on both progress and success, although the coefficient 
is not significant for industry experience in the latter instance. The opposite effects of prior start-
up experience on persistence and success help explain why the estimated effect of this variable 
sometimes comes out as weak or non-existent (Davidsson & Gordon, in press) and highlights the 
importance of performing the type of analyses displayed in Table 2. 
Also as predicted, venture idea novelty is ascribed no systematic effect on persistence, while 
its effect on both progress and success is significantly negative. Thus, founders of ventures rep-
resenting greater novelty are up for a relatively tougher task. The results for business planning 
are interesting and highly suggestive. In the analysis of persistence business planning is ascribed a 
marginally significant negative effect. This suggests that planning may facilitate the abandonment 
of (supposedly) less promising ventures at an earlier stage (unless it indicates planning induces 
unwarranted pessimism). At any rate, there is indication that leading to “foolish consistency” is not 
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a dominant effect of planning—and that earlier findings suggesting negative effects of planning on 
success may have been driven by effects on persistence rather than on success as such. As predicted 
by goal- and action theories, planning has a positive effect on subsequent action. However, the 
effect on success is statistically non-significant and negative in sign, keeping alive doubts about the 
general benefits of business planning as actually used by business founders. 
ConCLusions AnD LimitAtions
Table 4 summarizes the results in relation to the hypotheses. As it is not really correct to talk 
about “support” where an indeterminate relationship was suggested we use the label “consistent” 
(with the hypothesis) if the empirical outcome is a statistically non-significant relationship. As 
can be seen most of the results are clearly in support of our directional hypotheses or at least in 
line with our suggestions of indeterminate relationships. Overall, we would suggest the results 
support the notion that greater theoretical and empirical precision regarding the drivers of differ-
ent aspects of the venture creation process facilitates the understanding of what otherwise might 
appear and overwhelmingly complex phenomenon to disentangle. 
Our conceptual and empirical analyses highlight a particular problem with using persistence 
(continuance; survival) as the sole outcome variable venture creation research. First, its conceptual 
duality—the fact that it may reflect laudable and fruitful tenacity as well as stubborn clinging to 
unproductive ideas made it difficult to derive directional hypotheses—in fact, all our predictions 
regarding persistence were for indeterminate relationships—and suggests the concept may 
require further theoretical and empirical development beyond what we attempt here, so that 
these opposing forces can be disentangled. Thus, not only is persistence problematic when used 
as surrogate indicator of success, it may also be problematic as a theoretical dependent variable 
in its own right. This is somewhat serious as it has been a frequently used outcome criterion in 
venture creation research (Davidsson & Gordon, in press). Our theoretical analysis suggests few 
clear predictions can be made and our empirical results suggest that the only really strong predic-
tor of persistence is previous persistence—for good or bad, those who have already got further in 
the process and invested more time in it are less likely to give up; an effect curtailed only by prior 
start-up experience. 
We claim as a contribution steps toward greater precision both in the conceptual definition 
of venture creation success and regarding its operationalization. However, limitations should be 
admitted concerning the suggested operationalization. First, including reference to the potential 
sale of the venture it admittedly represents a mix of our definitions of individual- and venture level 
success, respectively. Second, it relies to a considerable degree on respondents’ subjective assess-
ments. Third, it is subject to a practical problem that will affect most research in practice, namely 
that the research does not follow the ventures long enough to get a definitive answer in all cases 
as to whether they are successful or not. This creates a potential for confounding process success 
and process duration, which is yet another aspect of the venture creation process that needs its own 
development, both conceptually and in terms of design and operationalization. 
CONTACT: Per Davidsson; per.davidsson@qut.edu.au; (T): +61731382051; (F): +61731381299; 
Queensland U. of Technology, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane Qld 4001, Australia.
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notEs
i.   Admittedly, this creates a definitional problem when a venture is bought at an overly high 
price by new owners. While under the old owners the venture may have become classified as 
successful at a given level of profitability over a given period of time (sufficient for covering all 
start-up costs) it will under the new owners require a much higher level of profitability and/
or more time to recoup also their disproportionately high investment in the venture.
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Table 1. Summary of hypotheses
Engagement Persistence
Progress (given 
persistence)
Success (given 
persistence)
General Human Capital + ? ? ?
Specific Human Capital + ? + +
Venture Idea Novelty N/A ? - -
Business Planning N/A ? + ?
Table 2. Effects of Human Capital on Engagement
Entrepreneurial Engagement
General Human Capital:
  University education  .308 ***
  Founder Age  .325 ***
  Founder Age Squared -.002 ***
Specific Human Capital:
  Self-Employed Parent(s) .386 ***
  Sex (1 = female) -.413 ***
Constant -1.301 *
N 1496
Nagelkerke R2 .131
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Table 3. Effects of Human Capital, Novelty and Business Planning on Different Outcomes
Persistence
Progress (given 
persistence)
Success (given 
persistence)
Controls
  W1 Stage of Development .069 *** -.048 # .060 #
  W1-W2 Hours invested 1.282 *** 729 ** .093 n.s.
  Industry: Retailing .569 #   .262 n.s .280 n.s.
  Industry: Construction -.283 n.s. -.189 n.s. -.571 n.s.
  Industry: CEH Services .182 n.s. .913 ** .177 n.s.
  Venture Type: Product based -.522 # -.122 n.s. -.501 n.s
  Venture Type: Brick_and_Mortar Only .085 n.s .051 n.s. .808 *
  Venture Type: Growth Focus .505 # .815 ** -1.108 *
  Founder category: Spouse team -.323 n.s. .448 n.s. -.218 n.s.
  Founder category: Other team -.548 # .268 n.s. -1.099 *
General Human Capital:
  Education Level .115 n.s. -.042 n.s. -.244 #
  Founder Age .031 n.s. .027 n.s. .095 n.s.
  Founder Age Squared .000 n.s.     .000 n.s.  -.001n.s.
Specific Human Capital:
  Industry experience (log years) .492 * .696 ** .405 n.s.
  Start-up experience (log count) -.989 * 1.214 ** 1.535 ***
Venture Idea Novelty:
  W1 Overall Novelty Score .040 n.s. -.112 * -.174 *
Business Planning:
  W1 Existence of Business Plan  
  of Any Kind
-.449 # .646 * -.382 n.s.
Constant -4.705 ** -2.345 n.s. -4.299 n.s.
N 488 337 337
Nagelkerke R2 .358 .229 .247
Table 4. Summary of results in relation to the stated hypotheses.
Engagement Persistence
Progress (given 
persistence)
Success (given 
persistence)
General Human Capital Supported (+) Consistent (?) Consistent (?) Consistent (?)
Specific Human Capital Supported (+)  Consistent [cont. 
on oper.] (?)
Supported (+) Supported [cont. on 
oper.] (+)
Venture Idea Novelty N/A Consistent (?) Supported (-) Supported (-)
Business Planning N/A “Marginally 
Consistent” (?)
Supported (+) Consistent (?)
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